Pittsburgh columnist rips Pirates for being MLB's real problem over Dodgers

The parity discussion is a pretty popular one among baseball fans these days. Many fans, especially those of small-market teams (like the Pirates), feel that the reckless, unprecedented spending of teams in larger markets (like the Dodgers) is what's ruining the sport.

Others, like Pittsburgh Post-Gazette columnist and 93.7 The Fan radio host Joe Starkey, pin the blame on the Pirates.

Starkey's piece was prompted by a quote from MLB commissioner Rob Manfred around the time of pitchers and catchers reporting for spring training. When speaking about the Dodgers and their astronomical budget, instead of making a statement about competitive balance or creating a level playing field, Manfred lauded the Dodgers for doing "everything possible, always within the rules that currently exist, to put the best possible team on the field."

The "always within the rules" quip was clearly in reference to the Dodgers' inclusion of deferred payments in some of their big-money contracts. And while, yes, every team has the ability to defer money (and some do—Alex Bregman, Corbin Burnes, and Anthony Santander each had deferrals of at least $60 million in the deals they signed this offseason), nobody does this quite like the Dodgers.

While the Shohei Ohtani contract is the most obvious and extreme example, the Dodgers have included deferred money in multiple recent contracts:

It's a lot easier to win when spending $389 million on payroll in one season (as the Dodgers are currently slated to do). It's even easier to do so while paying the best player in the sport only $2 million annually, as the Dodgers are with Ohtani over the course of his deal. They're banking on still being able to win while paying $68 million per year to a player no longer playing for them (and that doesn't include any other players' deferred money).

For better or for worse, that does fall within the rules, as Manfred noted. It's also a far cry from the way Bob Nutting and the Pirates do business.

The Pirates, on the other hand, are projected to see a $1.2 million increase in payroll from their 2024 figure that, as is their norm, ranked in the bottom-five in MLB. They were still under that figure by multiple million dollars until the team signed Andrew Heaney in late February.

There aren't many folks outside the Pirates' front office who believe that the team is pouring sufficient financial resources into the roster. The strategy made sense amid a full-blown rebuild, but the current regime is now in its sixth year and, thanks to the implementation of the draft lottery, lucked into a generationally-talented pitcher; still, there seems to be no urgency.

Starkey pulled a Ben Cherington quote from 2020, where he cited a confidence in having all of the necessary resources at his disposal to build a winning team and said that they are "going to try and get there as soon as we can." It's fair to not want to replicate the Chris Archer trade that marked the downfall of the previous regime, but the Pirates employ the best pitcher in the sport (and are paying him relative pennies) and seem to be in no hurry.

Suppose the Pirates solved their question marks at first base and in the outfield by signing Christian Walker and Anthony Santander. Adding their salaries (a combined $38 million in 2025) would put the Pirates' payroll at the highest it's ever been by nearly $30 million, while also still being a bottom-10 payroll in MLB.

But since the Pirates clearly aren't suited to participate in free agency to that extent, it would have made more sense for Pittsburgh to be aggressive in the trade front to use their stockpile of young pitchers to add quality bats for a lesser financial cost. Aside from trading for an unproven first baseman with chronic wrist issues, the Pirates have very seldom been linked to any significant bats.

Both organizations operate this way despite MLB's revenue sharing system, which was updated in the latest collective bargaining agreement. Under the new policy, each team throws 48% of their local revenue income into a pot, which is then split equally between all 30 teams. Additionally, the 30 teams split the league's national revenue. This results in the Pirates banking hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and it's certainly fair to question where that money goes if the payroll is only increasing modestly.

The competitive balance tax that was updated in the same CBA doesn't seem to deter teams like the Dodgers. While the Pirates passed on Austin Hays and Randal Grichuk (each of whom are earning $5 million in 2025), the Dodgers committed $30 million total to outfielder Michael Conforto and reliever Kirby Yates, neither of whom were really a necessity. The Dodgers were already over the steepest tax threshold before signing either player, and because of that (in addition to how many consecutive years the Dodgers have been over that line), they will wind up having to pay a 110% tax on their salaries (and yes, some of that tax money goes to revenue-sharing payees like the Pirates).

It often feels like the Pirates and the Dodgers aren't even playing the same sport.

Not many would argue that the current system is broken—that, despite the revenue sharing practices in place, teams like the Dodgers and Mets (who will likely wind up paying Juan Soto more than $800 million) seem to have bottomless pockets, and that there should be more than a handful of teams truly in play for the top free agents every winter.

It's fair to want steeper punishments for teams spending that kind of money, even though it is "within the rules that currently exist." It's also fair to wish for teams like the Pirates and Athletics (who are still facing a potential grievance from the MLBPA) to be further incentivized to spend the money that is funneled into their pockets annually.

The Dodgers are truly exhausting all possible resources to build a sustainable winning team. Frankly, the same can't be said of the Pirates. Maybe Starkey was right.